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The Need For Public Policy Interventions in
Information Security
David Pym, Joe Swierzbinski, and Julian Williams
Abstract Should public policy-makers set minimum levels of behaviour for indi-
viduals and corporations regarding information security policies and investments?
We consider a model in which a finite number of targets are at risk of attack, attacks
are costly, and have a finite probability of success. One important innovation is an
explicit model of the decisions of potential attackers on whether to mount attacks.
The model shows how the behaviour of attackers and the nature of the technological
environment can create a role for a policy-maker to coordinate optimal minimum
levels of protective expenditure for firms.
1 Introduction and Related Work
There is currently an ongoing policy debate concerning the appropriate nature and
extent of regulation to maintain the security of information assets. On one side of
the debate, some policy-makers argue that the provision of advisory information by
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governments and the use of voluntary standards would be the best choice. Others
maintain that some form of compulsory regulation is required.
For example, the UK Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology made the
following observation concerning the issue of cyber security. “Opinion is divided as
to whether cyber security regulation by government would be the best way forwards.
Regulation could increase the level of adherence to best practice, however it will
always lag behind developments in technology and would be difficult to monitor.”
(see POSTNOTE 389, Sept. 2011).
In the European Union, ENISA (the European Network and Information Security
Agency) is seriously considering the use of compliance-based regulations to sup-
plement voluntary approaches. (ENISA, 2012). In contrast, in the United States, the
presumption is that what is required is a culture of voluntary good practice based
on efficient information sharing. (See, for example, Blueprint for a Secure Cyber
Future, Dept. of Homeland Security, 2011.)
Our paper demonstrates how a need for compulsory regulation can arise in the
context of cyber security. We identify a taxonomy of externalities and analyze how
these factors can cause a divergence between unregulated private actions and those
that would minimize the overall cost to society from cyber threats.
In order to make our arguments more precise, we develop a formal model of
attacker behaviour and the incentives of targets to invest in defensive expenditure.
The model is a contribution to a well-established conceptual framework in the eco-
nomic literature on industrial organization that uses game theory to model strategic
investment decisions.1 One important innovation of our model is to highlight the
importance of the role of attacker behaviour in creating a need for policy interven-
tion.
The model shows the circumstances under which the social and private incentives
to invest in cyber security can be expected to differ. One surprising result is that even
if the technological environment were to be modified to minimize conflicts between
social and private incentives, the nature of attacker behaviour is itself likely to create
an incentive for underinvestment in security and a consequent need for government
regulation.
In the context of our paper, an externality exists when the defensive action of one
prospective target of cyber attacks also affects the risks faced or losses incurred by
other targets. Reductions in the risks or losses to other agents resulting from one
target’s defensive expenditure are a valuable byproduct from a social perspective.
However, it is reasonable to expect that an individual decision maker will tend to
undervalue such beneficial effects for others when weighing the costs versus the
benefits of additional defensive expenditure. This in turn will typically result in an
underinvestment in security from the perspective of society as a whole.
Externalities can occur because of the nature of the technological environment.
For example, a vulnerability in the software or hardware of one prospective target
may create an avenue for attacks on other targets. In addition, when a successful
1 See, for example, Shapiro (1989) and Tirole (1998) for applications of game-theoretic models to
the economics of industrial organization.
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attack is carried out on one target, this may create losses for others as well. For ex-
ample, when one firm’s service is interrupted due to an attack, the firm’s customers
may suffer losses that are not fully compensated by the firm in question. We will
sometimes refer to externalities that result from the technological environment in
which targets operate as “ecosystem” externalities.
The analysis in our paper demonstrates that the behaviour of attackers can be
another source of externalities which create a role for public policy. The defensive
expenditure of any one target can make attacks on the entire population of targets
less attractive for potential attackers. By doing so, the defensive expenditure of one
target can reduce the level of attacks on all targets, thus providing an external benefit.
There is evidence from documented attacks to suggest that attackers must balance
expected rewards and costs in making attacks. For example, in 2011 an FBI indict-
ment of six Estonian nationals on “click fraud” reported that approximately $14
Million was raised from the infection of four million machines using DNSChanger
Malware.2 However, this attack required substantial investment in legitimate web
businesses as a front for the fraud.
There is also evidence that attackers dynamically readjust their effort in response
to the behaviour of attackers and potential targets. For example, Herley (2012) ob-
serve that one reason for email phishing attacks is to identify the email users who
are most likely to fall prey to an attack. They observe that such behaviour is only
sensible if an attack on all potential targets is too costly and attackers intend to focus
attacks on more vulnerable targets. Baldwin et al. (2012) show that spikes in attacks
on specific systems can lead to mutual excitement of attacks on other systems. Such
behaviour suggests that attackers respond to an indication of a profitable opportunity
(i.e., the initial attacks) by launching more attacks.
The “conficker” computer worm provides an example of the importance of ex-
ternalities in the context of cyber security. The conficker worm was first detected in
2008 and, at its peak in early 2009, had infected between 9 and 15 million comput-
ers.3
An interesting aspect of the conficker worm was that it posed relatively little dan-
ger to an individual infected machine, but turned this machine (usually in its down
time) into a component of a larger “botnet” which was then used to mount attacks
on larger computer systems via spam emails or denial of service style attacks.
One of the issues with combating such a worm was that many of the comput-
ers involved were commercial units housed in call centers and other large offices.4
Because of the relatively small level of damage to individual machines and the rel-
atively high cost of defending against the conficker virus, the time taken to mitigate
2 Source: FBI Press Release, Malware 110911 “International Cyber Ring That Infected Millions
of Computers Dismantled”, September 11, 2011.
3 See: Markoff, John (2009-01-22). “Worm Infects Millions of Computers Worldwide”. New York
Times.
4 See: Leffall, Jabulani (2009-01-15). ”Conficker worm still wreaking havoc on Windows systems”.
Government Computer News.
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this worm was relatively slow. Nearly four years after the worm’s release, 1.7 mil-
lion machines were still infected with the conficker worm.5
Although the conficker worm was not particularly sophisticated technologically,
it exploited in a sophisticated way the perverse economic incentives created by ex-
ternalities. The cost of mitigation for large offices was higher than the risk adjusted
cost to these offices of having the worm on their systems. Hence, many firms were
slow to take action to remove it.
There is a large literature in the field of economics on externalities and related
topics such as public goods. See, for example, Varian (2010) for an introductory
discussion and Cornes and Sandler (1996) and Laffont (2008) for more advanced
treatments. However, there have been relatively few applications of the economic
theory of externalities to the field of computer security.
There is a large literature in Economics on externalities and related topics such
as public goods. See, for example, Varian (2010) for an introductory discussion and
Cornes and Sandler (1996) and Laffont (2008) for more advanced treatments. How-
ever, there have been relatively few applications of the economic theory of exter-
nalities to the field of computer security. Varian (2004) is one well known example
that considers how the nature of technological externalities may affect the level of
investment in the reliability of information systems.
Varian (2004) considers how the nature of technological externalities may affect
the level of investment in the reliability of information systems. Arora et al. (2008)
models a single firm’s policy for disclosing and patching software vulnerabilities.
The paper shows that the timing of disclosure depends on the fraction of the total
cost of an attack which is not borne by the firm. Kunreuther and Heal (2003a) and
Kunreuther and Heal (2003b) model a group of agents each of which can choose
between two alternatives that affect not only the agent’s own risk but also the risk
of other agents. They consider factors that can cause the equilibrium actions of the
group to tip from the high-risk to the low-risk alternative.
An early contribution to the literature on investment in information security by
Straub and Welke (1998) outlines a model of threat and countermeasure that models
risk as a combination of attacker and defender effort. Treating risk as a function of
defender effort, Gordon and Loeb (2002) present a model of decreasing marginal
returns to security investment. They propose a residual risk function that relates in-
vestment to the probability of a successful attack. Optimal investment in security is,
therefore, a tradeoff between the risk adjusted expected loss and the deterministic
level of investment. Other threat models, such as Ioannidis et al. (2009, 2011, 2012);
Chen et al. (2011) or Gordon et al. (2010), utilize a real options or portfolio opti-
mization approach to model the defensive response of a firm. In the above papers,
the behaviour of attackers is assumed to be exogenous in the sense that attackers do
not respond to targets’ actions.
Some papers consider the interactions between attackers and defenders. For ex-
ample, in Cavusoglu et al. (2008) a firm’s security manager must estimate an at-
tacker effort function in order to compute the firm’s optimal expenditure on secu-
5 See: Microsoft Security Intelligence Report: Volume 11, Microsoft, 2011
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rity. Florencio and Herley (2011) considers the relationship between the incentives
of attackers to mount attacks and the observed volume of attacks. The papers by
Cremonini and Nizovtsev (2010) and Fultz and Grossklags (2009) model the level
of security in a computer network as the outcome of a strategic game between at-
tackers and defenders. Png et al. (2006) model the response of a single attacker to
the security efforts of a number of software users.
Our paper focuses on the divergence between social and private incentives caused
by both the strategic behaviour of attackers and by technological interactions among
targets in a fairly general setting. By doing so, the paper sheds light on the circum-
stances in which public policy intervention could be desirable for a potentially wide
range of security investments. Our numerical example shows that the gains from
such regulation can be substantial.
The paper now proceeds as follows, Section 2 outlines our model for the general
case. Section 3 introduces a public policy-maker with a weighted average objective
function and solves for the optimal policy. Section 4 provides an example of how
to implement this framework and illustrates a complementary approach to demon-
strating attacker effort as an externality. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding
remarks and ideas for further extension of this research area.
2 The Model
2.1 Technology of Attack and Defence
We consider a model in which a fixed number of targets i = 1, . . . ,NT are at risk of
attack. Let nAi denote the average number of attacks made against target i in any
given period. Although we consider the case where nAi is specified exogenously
as a benchmark, in general nAi is determined endogenously through our model of
attacker behaviour.
Targets can reduce the probability that an attack is successful by engaging in
defensive expenditure. Let X = (x1, . . . ,xNT ) denote the vector of defensive expen-
ditures chosen by all the targets.
Let σi = σi(X,nAi) denote the conditional probability that one or more attacks
mounted against target i are successful. For the purposes of this paper, the tech-
nology of attack and defence is summarized by the properties of the functions
σi(X,nAi).
It is plausible that the probability σi should depend on the level of defensive
expenditure by target i and the average number of attacks mounted against target
i. Our model also allows the possibility that σi depends positively on the defensive
expenditure of one or more other targets j. We say in this case that a technological or
“ecosystem” externality exists, since the defensive expenditure of target j provides
an “external” benefit to target i, and this benefit occurs because of the nature of the
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technological interactions that determine the environment or “ecosystem” in which
attacks occur.
We assume the following properties of the functions σi(X,nAi):
Property 1: ∂σi/∂nAi > 0 for all i, so that an increase in the average number of
attacks against a target increases the probability that at least one attack is successful
for all levels of defensive expenditure xi and any number of attacks nAi;
Property 2: ∂σi/∂xi < 0 for all i so that an increase in the defensive expenditure of
a target reduces the probability that some attack on that target is successful;
Property 3: ∂ 2σi/∂x2i > 0 for all i, at least for large enough values of xi. Property
3 implies that the marginal returns to defensive expenditure are decreasing, at least
for large enough values of xi;
Property 4: ∂σi/∂x j ≤ 0, for all i and j 6= i. Property 4 ensures that, if an ecosystem
externality exists, it represents a potential benefit in that firm j’s expenditure reduces
firm i’s risk.6
2.2 Attacker Behaviour
For simplicity, we assume that all potential attackers are identical. In particular,
each attacker has the same, constant cost, CA, of mounting an attack. Suppose, in
addition, that each attacker participating in attacks mounts one attack in any given
period.
Let Ri(nAi) denote the expected monetary reward per attack against target i when
one or more of these attacks turns out to be successful. We suppose that dRi/dnAi ≤
0 to indicate the possible effects that competition among attackers to obtain a greater
share of the reward can have on the expected reward per attack.
In order to highlight the effects of competition among attackers, we consider, in
most of this paper, a version of the model where attackers obtain a constant expected
reward Ri when there are one or more successful attacks on target i. Each attacker
participating in attacks on target i is assumed to obtain an equal share of this reward.
Hence, Ri(nAi) = Ri/nAi in this case.
One circumstance that produces an equal share rule like that described in the pre-
vious paragraph is a case where the “first-winner-takes-all”. In such a case, the first
attacker who mounts a successful attack against target i receives the entire reward Ri,
and all other attackers mounting attacks against this target receive nothing. If each
attack has an equal chance of being the first one to be successful, then the probabil-
ity that a given attack is the one to obtain the reward from “success” is simply 1/nAi
and Ri(nAi) = Ri/nAi.
Other models of how attacks generate rewards are possible. At the other extreme
from the “first-winner-takes-all” model, we might assume that successful attacks re-
semble an attack by nAi sharks against a shoal of fish. Each shark eats approximately
6 Note that ecosystem externalities need not be symmetric. It could be the case, for example, that
∂σi/∂x j < 0, but ∂σ j/∂xi = 0. Moreover, ecosystem externalities may exist between some targets,
all targets, or no targets.
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the same chunk of fish from the school. Such a “shark attack” could be modeled by
assuming that Ri(nAi) = Ri for all nAi.
We suppose that attackers wish to maximize their expected profit. The expected
profit which an attacker obtains from mounting an attack on target i is given by the
following expression.
σi(X,nAi)Ri(nAi) − CA (1)
If attackers can direct their attacks against particularly vulnerable targets within
the population of targets, then the fact that the expected profit from an attack in
Equation 1 can differ across attackers raises potentially interesting questions about
the additional incentives for defensive expenditure posed by the threat of such di-
rected attacks. In order to focus on other incentive problems stemming from the
dynamics of attacker choice, we make the following simplifying assumptions.
Suppose that attackers can observe the overall level of vulnerability for the pop-
ulation of targets but not the degree of vulnerability of any particular target. In this
case, there is no reason for an attacker to attack one target instead of another. Or
suppose, for some other reason, that each attacker directs attacks randomly against
targets.
We further approximate a random assignment of attackers to targets by intro-
ducing the simplifying assumption that the total number of attacks, NA, are spread
uniformly over the NT targets. In this case, nAi = nA = NA/NT for all i.
The cost CA of mounting an attack includes the opportunity cost to the attacker
of the lost profit from pursuing his or her next best choice. In this case, attackers
should be motivated to launch attacks on the population of targets as long as the
expected reward from launching an attack is greater than the cost of launching an











The left-hand side of Equation 2 represents the expected reward to an attacker
from mounting an attack against the population of targets under consideration. The
right-hand side of this equation is simply the cost to an attacker for mounting an
attack. Equation 2 asserts that more attacks will be mounted until, in equilibrium,
the expected reward from an attack equals the cost of the attack.
To simplify calculations, we suppose that a fractional number of attackers can
choose to make attacks in any given period. In this case, the equilibrium number of
attacks per target, n∗A, will satisfy Equation 2 exactly rather than approximately as
would be the case if n∗A were required to be an integer.
7
For Equation 2 to represent a reasonable model of attacker dynamics, the ex-
pected reward per attack on the left-hand side of Equation 2 should be a decreasing
function of the number of attacks per target, nA, at least near the equilibrium level
7 To allow formally for a fractional number of attackers per target, we suppose that there are a
continuum of potential attackers with the total mass of potential attackers equal to NPA. The total
number of actual attackers NA must be less than or equal to NPA.















for nA close to n∗A. For the “equal share” and “first winner takes all” models dis-
cussed earlier, dRi/dnA→−∞ as nA becomes small, so that Equation 3 is satisfied
for small enough values of nA as long as ∂σi/∂nA is bounded.
An important question that must be addressed in studies of attacker dynamics
is: what determines the number of attacks? We believe that our model provides a
promising answer to this question. The number of attacks is limited in our model by
the competition for the rewards from a successful attack. This competition eventu-
ally reduces the expected reward to each attacker and thus provides a natural limit
to the number of attacks.
Our explanation for what limits attacks will not be suitable in all circumstances.
For example, in the “shark attack” model mentioned previously, the expected reward
per attack against target i, Ri(nAi)σi(X,nAi) is an increasing rather than a decreasing
function of nAi. In the shark attack model, there is no need for competition among
attackers to divide the rewards from a successful attack. Moreover, the greater the
number of attacks, the greater is the chance that at least one will be successful.
Note that the equilibrium level of attackers per target, n∗A, satisfying Equation 2
depends in general on the vector of defensive expenditures by the NT targets. The
dependence of n∗A(X) on the levels of defensive expenditure chosen by the various
targets has important implications for public policy.
2.3 Target Behaviour
Let Li denote the expected value of the loss suffered by target i when one or more
successful attacks on target i occurs. For simplicity, we suppose that Li does not
depend on the number of successful attacks but only on whether a successful attack
occurs. This could be the case, for example, if the vulnerability which permitted a
successful attack is patched after the first successful attack.
Targets are assumed to be risk neutral. Hence, we suppose that a target i will wish
to choose its level of defensive expenditure xi to minimize the expected loss
σi(X,n∗A)Li + xi (4)
The objective in Equation 4 includes both the expected damage from an attack, σi Li,
and the cost of the defensive expenditure xi, which the target must pay whether or
not a successful attack occurs.
Note that the defensive expenditures of other targets can potentially affect target
i’s objective function in two ways. First, there may be ecosystem externalities. In
addition, the equilibrium number of attacks against target i, n∗A, typically depends on
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the entire vector of defensive expenditures X. This dependence introduces a second
type of externality through which target j’s choice can affect target i.
2.4 Nash Equilibrium
For potential attackers, the expected payoff from an attack depends, in part, on the
defensive choices of the targets. Similarly, the expected loss to a target depends on
the number of attacks and, hence, on the choices of potential attackers. We model
the strategic interaction between the choices of attackers and targets as a game.
A strategy for each potential attacker consists of a choice whether or not to par-
ticipate in attacks on the population of targets. A strategy for target i is a choice of
the level of defensive expenditure xi. In a Nash equilibrium of the game between at-
tackers and targets, the strategies of attackers and targets must be optimal given the
expectations about the strategies held by other players. Moreover, these expectations
must be correct when all parties behave optimally.8
Suppose that each player chooses its strategy simultaneously. When there are a
large number of potential attackers, it will generally be optimal for some but not
all such attackers to participate in attacks. Hence, each potential attacker must be
indifferent between participating or not participating in an attack. For this to be the
case, the equilibrium number of attacks per target in the Nash equilibrium, nEA , must






E) on the right-hand side of Equation 17 is the solution to Equation 2
when the levels of defensive expenditure for the targets have been set equal to their
Nash equilibrium levels which are denoted by XE.
Let Xi denote a vector of defensive expenditures by all targets except target i.
Suppose that each target i chooses its level of defensive expenditure to minimize
the expected loss in Equation 4 taking the number of attacks, nA, and the levels of
defensive expenditure of the other targets, Xi, as fixed. For all values of nA and Xi,
we suppose that the loss-minimizing level of defensive expenditure for target i is
given by the usual first-order condition specified by the following equation:
−∂σi(X,nA)
∂xi
Li = 1 (6)
where the vector X in Equation 6 consists of the vector Xi of defensive expenditures
for all targets except target i and the scalar xi representing target i’s defensive ex-
penditure. Let xi(Xi,nA) denote the solution of Equation 6. We assume this solution
exists and is unique for all Xi and nA.
8 See, for example, Binmore (2007) or Myerson (1991).
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The Nash equilibrium levels of defensive expenditure, XE, satisfy the following






where xEi is the equilibrium level of expenditure for target i, XEi denotes the equilib-
rium levels of defensive expenditure for all targets except i, and nEA is the equilibrium
number of attacks per target. A Nash equilibrium of the game between attackers and
targets is characterized by a quantity nEA and a vector X
E satisfying Equation 7, (in
our worked example in Section 4 this will simplify to Equation 17).
3 A Role for Public Policy
In this section, we consider a policy-maker who wishes to minimize a weighted
average of the expected losses suffered by the population of targets. Proposition 1
introduces the “incentive decomposition equation” that provides an interpretation of
the benefits to society from additional defensive expenditure. Proposition 2 shows
that the policy-maker will not generally wish to choose the level of expenditure
determined in the unregulated Nash equilibrium.
Policy makers who may have the interest and ability to influence the defensive
expenditures of targets include government regulators and law makers as well as
the administrators of large computing facilities, such as cloud computing platforms,
which are shared by the targets.9
In addition, once risk aversion has been introduced and insurance becomes an
issue, insurance providers are also likely to have both the ability and desire to influ-
ence the level of defensive expenditure via the terms of insurance contracts offered
to targets. Of course, the objectives of some of these parties are likely to be more
complicated than simply the minimization of average losses.
Consider a policy-maker who can set the level of defensive expenditure for each
target i and wishes to choose the vector of defensive expenditures for the targets to





νi [σi(X,n∗A(X))Li + xi] (8)
where νi are positive weights indicating how much importance the policy-maker





νi = 1 . (9)
9 See, for example, Motahari-Nezhad et al. (2009) and Pearson (2009), and for an overview from
the insurance perspective see “Managing Digital Risk”, Lloyd’s 360 Risk Insight 2010, for a discus-
sion of cloud computing and some of the risks associated with the cloud computing environment.
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Several features of the objective function in Equation 8 are worth noting. First,
the formulation in Equation 8 implicitly assumes that target i bears the full cost of a
successful attack on it. In principle, a successful attack on target i may impose losses
on other members of society as well. For example, target i may provide services to
consumers which are interrupted by a successful attack. One justification for our
assumption is that target i chooses to provide compensation for all losses suffered
by others from a successful attack. Target i might be motivated to provide such
compensation because of liability laws or the desire to preserve a good reputation.
Uncompensated losses to other members of society from a successful attack on
target i would comprise another type of technological or “ecosystem” externality.
For simplicity, we do not consider this additional source of externalities in our anal-
ysis. Such externalities are straightforward to include and would not significantly
affect the results of our analysis.10
Note that the equilibrium number of attacks per target is written as n∗A(X) in
Equation 8. The equilibrium number of attacks per target is written in this way to
emphasize that the policy-maker explicitly considers the effects of the targets’ levels
of defensive expenditure on attacker behaviour when choosing X.
We suppose that the choice of X which minimizes the objective in Equation 8 sat-
isfies the usual first-order conditions for an optimum. These first-order conditions
can be rewritten as Equation 10 below. We refer to this equation as the “incentive
decomposition equation” because it decomposes the marginal benefits from invest-
ment in defensive expenditure into four components. The extent to which a target is
able to capture each component of benefit determines how the target’s incentive to
engage in such investment compares with that of the policy-maker.
































where, to simplify the notation, we have suppressed the dependence of the functions
n∗A(X) and σi(X,nA) on their various arguments.
Proof. The policy-maker’s preferred choice of defensive expenditure for target i
is obtained by setting the partial derivative of the objective function in Equation 10
with respect to xi equal to zero. Dividing the resulting function by νi and rearranging
terms produces the first-order condition for the optimal level of xi that is specified
in Equation 10. 
10 Recall that the quantity Li denotes the cost to target i from a successful attack. Let LSi denote
the uncompensated costs borne by other members of society from a successful attack on target i.
The effect of these losses can be included in our analysis by replacing Li in Equation 8 by the sum
Li +LSi .
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Discussion of Proposition 1
Properties 1, 2, and 4 of the functions σi(X,nAi) listed in Section 2 imply that the
second and third the terms in on the left-hand side of Equation 10 are positive if the
quantity ∂n∗A/∂xi is negative.
An expression for ∂n∗A/∂xi can be obtained by taking the partial derivative of the
left-hand side of Equation 2 with respect to xi and setting the result equal to zero.11
Applying Properties 2 and 4 from Section 2 to the resulting equation shows that
∂n∗A/∂xi is negative if the inequality in Equation 3 is satisfied.
As in Equation 6, the first term on the left-hand side of Equation 10 represents the
marginal reduction in expected damages to target i caused by the direct effect of an
additional unit of defensive expenditure by target i on the probability σi. The direct
effect occurs even when the number of attackers per target is fixed exogenously. As
discussed in Section 2, ∂σi/∂xi is assumed to be negative since an increase in the
level of defensive expenditure should reduce the probability that at least one attack
is successful. In this case, the first term is positive, which is what intuition would
suggest.
The second term on the left-hand side of Equation 10 represents the marginal re-
duction in the expected damages to target i that occurs indirectly because an increase
in target i’s defensive expenditure reduces the incentive for attackers to participate
in attacks. This indirect benefit to target i is also positive.
In the Nash equilibrium described in Section 2.4, the assumption that players
make their choices simultaneously implies that each target i takes the number of
attacks per target as fixed when choosing its level of defensive expenditure. This
assumption seems plausible since a change in any single target’s defensive expendi-
ture should have only a small effect on the overall vulnerability of the population of
targets especially if the number of targets is large. In contrast, the policy maker sets
the levels of defensive expenditures for all targets at once. Hence, it is plausible to
assume, as we do, that the policy-maker takes into account the effect that changes
in defensive expenditure would have on the behaviour of potential attackers.
Although, for simplicity, we considered a game in which targets and attackers
made their choices simultaneously, we could have considered instead a game with
sequential choices. In such a game, targets would first choose their levels of de-
fensive expenditure and attackers would then make their choices about whether or
not to participate in attacks. In such a game, a target would also consider the indi-
rect benefit to itself which occurs through the effect its defensive expenditure might
have on the equilibrium number of attacks per target. In this case, a term like that the
second term in Equation 10 would also appear on the left-hand side of Equation 6.
This change would not significantly affect our results. Whether individual choices
are modeled with a game in which moves are simultaneous or sequential, an impor-
11 Since the function n∗A(X) satisfies Equation 2 for a range of X, the partial derivative with respect
to xi of the left-hand side of Equation 2 must equal the partial derivative of the right-hand side,
which is zero.
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tant role for public policy remains because of the final term on the left-hand side of
Equation 10.
The expression within the final term on the left-hand side of Equation 10 rep-
resents the marginal reduction in the expected damages to targets other than target
i resulting from an additional unit of defensive expenditure by target i. The terms
−∂σ j/∂xi, for j 6= i indicate the effects of possible ecosystem externalities which
cause the defensive expenditure by target i to directly affect the probability that a
successful attack is made on target j. Even when these terms are zero, the remain-
ing terms in the summation on the left-hand side of Equation 10 indicate the benefit
to other targets j caused because the defensive expenditure by target i reduces the
overall profitability of attacks and, hence, the average number of attacks per target.
The final term on the left-hand side of Equation 10 create a diversion between
the private benefits of defensive expenditure by target i, which are those obtained
by target i, and the overall social benefits of this expenditure, which include the
benefits to other targets. In the absence of policy intervention, an individual target
is likely to have little or no incentive to take benefits for other targets into account
when choosing its level of defensive expenditure.
Proposition 2: The role of public policy
The levels of defensive expenditure chosen by firms in the Nash equilibrium de-
scribed in Section 2 are not socially optimal.
Proof. Proposition 2 is obtained by comparing Equation 6 and Equation 10. When
the number of attackers per target is set equal to the level nEA which occurs in the
Nash equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium levels of defensive expenditure, XE, satisfy
Equation 6, for each i. Substituting XE and nEA for X and nA(X) on the left-hand
side of Equation 10 indicates that, at the Nash equilibrium levels of expenditure
XE, the marginal reduction in the average expected damages produced by a small
increase in xi is greater than one. Hence, starting from the Nash equilibrium levels
of expenditure and the Nash equilibrium number of attackers, the average expected
loss can be reduced by increasing the expenditure of some target by a small amount.
The levels of defensive expenditure in the Nash equilibrium cannot, therefore, be
optimal from the policy-maker’s point of view. 
Corollary 2.1
If the number of attackers per target nA is fixed exogenously and there are no ecosys-
tem externalities, then the defensive expenditure of each firm in the Nash equilib-
rium is socially optimal.
Proof. When nA is fixed exogenously and there are no ecosystem externalities (so
that ∂σ j/∂xi = 0 for all i and j 6= i), then the second and third terms in Equation 10
vanish. In this case, the first-order condition for the policy-maker’s optimal choice
for xi reduces to Equation 6 which also describes the level of expenditure which
target i would choose in the Nash equilibrium. 
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The policy-maker does not need to intervene to obtain his or her desired re-
sult when the number of attackers per target is fixed exogenously and there are no
ecosystem externalities. The divergence between social and private benefits that mo-
tivates policy intervention occurs precisely because of the externalities introduced
by the technological interactions that produce ecosystem externalities and by the
response of attackers to the overall vulnerability of the population of targets.
4 A Policy Example with a First-Winner-Takes-All Model and
Identical Targets
This section presents a concrete example that illustrates the main ideas of the paper.
In addition to providing insight into the conclusions of our paper, the analysis in this
section can be regarded as providing an alternate justification for these conclusions.
In order to focus on the externalities caused by the behaviour of attackers, we
also assume in this example that there are no ecosystem externalities. Hence, the
probability that one or more attacks on target i are successful depends only on the
defensive expenditure of target i and the number of attacks on target i, nAi, and we
write this probability as σi(xi,nAi).
Moreover, we further assume that targets are identical before the levels of defen-
sive expenditure are chosen. Hence we can suppress the subscript i and write the
above function as σ(xi,nAi) for all i. We assume that the function σ(xi,nAi) has the
following functional form,
σ(xi,nai) = 1− exp(ln(1−α(xi))nAi) (11)
where
α(xi) = A0 e−a0 xi (12)
a0 is a positive constant and A0 ∈ (0,1] .
The motivation for Equation 11 is as follows. Suppose that α(xi) denotes the
probability that a single attack on target i will be successful. In this case, the quan-
tity A0 represents the probability that a single attack on target i is successful in the
absence of defensive expenditure, i.e., xi = 0, and a0 in represents the level of invest-
ment by a target that reduces the probability that a single attack is successful by the
factor 1/e. If the outcomes of individual attacks represent independent events and
there are a total of nAi attacks on target i, then σ(xi,nAi) must satisfy the following
equation:
σ(xi,nAi) = 1− (1−α(xi))nAi (13)
Equation 11 is simply the interpolation of Equation 13 to non-integer values of nAi.12
12 As a check on our analysis, we will sometimes find it convenient to also consider the fol-
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Targets are assumed to be risk neutral. As in Section 2, we model the unregulated
behaviour of attackers in terms of a game between attackers and targets where all
players move simultaneously.
Since targets are assumed to be identical, the loss incurred due to a successful
attack, L, is assumed to be the same for all targets. Target i chooses its level of
defensive expenditure, xi to minimize the expected loss, σ(xi,nAi)L+ xi taking the
number of attacks nAi as fixed. Let x∗(nAi) denote the solution to this minimization
problem for a given nAi. For the relevant range of values for nAi, this solution exists
and is unique for the parameter values and functional forms chosen in our example.
We can write the following equation:
x∗(nAi) = argmin
x
(σ (x,nAi)L+ x) (14)
Note that, since a target’s expected loss does not depend on i, the function x∗(nAi)
is the same for all targets i. We will refer to this function as a target’s “best reply
function” or “best response function” since it represents an optimal response (from
an individual target’s point of view) to a level of attack nA. Although, in principle,
different targets are free to choose different levels of defensive expenditure, it is
optimal for identical targets to choose the same level of defensive expenditure when
faced with the same level of threat, nA.
As in Section 2, we suppose that each potential attacker makes at most one at-
tack and there is an equal chance that an attacker attacks any given target. More-
over, we assume that the expected reward from a successful attack is described by
a first-winner-takes-all model. Suppose that each target chooses the same level of
defensive expenditure, x, and the number of attacks per target is nA. In this case,the






where R denotes the reward obtained by an attacker who makes the first successful
attack on a target, σ(X ,nA)/nA represents the probability that an attacker is the first
of the nA attackers to make a successful attack, and CA is the cost to an attacker from
making an attack. We continue to assume, for simplicity, that potential attackers are
identical so that CA is the same for all attackers. Equation 15 is the special case of
Equation 2 in Section 2 which is relevant for our example.
As discussed in Section 2, a strategy for each potential attacker in the Nash equi-
librium of the game we consider is a choice of whether or not to mount an attack.
With a large number of potential attackers, the two choices must be equally prof-
itable so that some but not all potential attackers choose to participate in attacks.
Hence, when each target chooses the same level of defensive expenditure, x, the
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where γ =CA/R is the cost of an attack per unit of reward. Equation 16 is obtained
by setting the objective in Equation 15 equal to zero and dividing by R. We refer to
n∗A(x) as the attacker’s response function since it describes how attackers respond to
the level of defensive expenditure chosen by the targets.13
Since all targets face the same number of attacks, all targets will choose the
same level of defensive expenditure in the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium
is therefore described by a pair of numbers, xE and nEA satisfying the following
equations.






Equation 17 asserts that the defensive expenditure of each target, xE , is optimal
given the targets’ beliefs about the level of attacks. In addition, the choices of poten-
tial attackers are optimal given their beliefs about the vulnerability of the population
of targets. Moreover, the beliefs of the targets and potential attackers are consistent
with the actual choices made in the Nash equilibrium.
Graphically, the equilibrium values, xE and nEA occur at the intersection of the
two curves, x∗(nA) and n∗A(x).
4.1 Baseline Model Parameters
The version of the model in our example involves only four exogenous parameters
A0, a0, L and γ =CA/R. For the remainder of this section our baseline case is that the
probability of a single successful attack given no defensive expenditure is A0 = 0.1,
the 1/e-life effectiveness of extra defensive expenditure is a0 = 0.5, the loss from
an attack is L = 10 units and the cost of attack to reward ratio is γ = 0.01.
Figure 1 graphs the probability σ that one or more successful attacks are made on
a given target for the parameter values specified above. Each curve shows how this
probability declines as the defensive expenditure x increases for selected numbers
of attackers (each executing a single attack) nA.
Figure 2 presents the expected loss, σL+ x, for a target as a function of the
defensive expenditure x. Each curve shows the expected loss for a different value of
nA.
For each indicated value of nA, the optimal level of defensive expenditure for a
target, x∗(nA), occurs where the curves in Figure 2 take on their minimum values.
From Figure 2 we observe that the shape of the expected loss function is well be-
13 For the quadratic approximation for σ , it is straightforward to compute an analytic formula for
the attacker response function. Simply substitute the approximate formula for σ into Equation 16





The results for this approximation are plotted as dashed lines in the graphs used to illustrate our
example.
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haved and the optimal level of defensive expenditure tends to zero as the number of
attackers becomes small.










































Fig. 1 The probability of a successful attack on a single target as a function of defensive expen-
diture x for several different numbers of attackers nA. The unbroken line plots the interpolated
function from Equation 11. The dashed line presents the function using a quadratic approximation.
For this graph, A0 = 0.1 and a0 = 0.5. These values will be used throughout the example.
Figure 3 shows the expected profit per unit of reward for an attacker, (σ(x,nA)/nA)
− γ , for the baseline scenario as a function of the total number of attackers. Each
curve shows the expected profit for a given level of defensive expenditure as a func-
tion of the number of attackers. The equilibrium level of attacks per target, n∗A(x),
occurs where the expected profit is zero so that potential attackers are indifferent
between participating and not participating in attacks.
The two response curves n∗A(x) and x
∗(nA), are plotted in Figure 4. The Nash
equilibrium values, xE and nEA , occur at the intersection of these two curves. Note
that the intersection of the dashed lines representing the quadratic approximation is
very close to the intersection of the solid lines.
4.2 The Policy-maker’s Problem
We now consider a benevolent policy-maker who wishes to minimize the expected
loss per target. In Section 3, we considered a general weighted average. Since the
targets in our example are identical, we restrict attention to the case where the ex-
pected loss for each target is given the same weight. In the notation of Section 3,
νi = 1/NT for all i.
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Fig. 2 The expected loss of a target, σL+xi, versus defensive expenditure of the target for various
numbers of attackers. The dashed line represents the expected loss calculated using the quadratic
approximation of σ and the unbroken line uses the interpolated version of σ . For this graph, we
set the value of the loss from a successful attack to L = 10 and this value will be used throughout
the example.











































Fig. 3 The expected reward per attacker versus the number of attackers for selected levels of
defensive expenditure by the targets. The cost reward ratio γ = 0.01 is used for this example. For
a given level of defensive expenditure the equilibrium number of attackers per target occurs where
the expected reward curve intersects a horizontal line through zero.
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Responses of Attackers and Targets
Attacker Response
Target Response
Fig. 4 The response curves for attackers and targets. The dashed and unbroken lines represent,
respectively, calculations using the quadratic and interpolated versions of the σ function. The
assumed parameters for this example are L = 10, γ = 0.01, A0 = 0.1 and a0 = 0.5. The Nash
equilibrium occurs at the point of intersection of the attacker and target response curves.
For ease of comparison with the Nash equilibrium, we also restrict attention to
the case where the policy maker specifies the same level of defensive expenditure for
each target. If the level of defensive expenditure, xP, which the policy maker finds
optimal to specify for each target differs from the Nash equilibrium level of defen-
sive expenditure, xE , that is sufficient to establish a role for compulsory regulation.
In what follows, we show that xP > xE for our example.
Substituting νi = 1/NT and xi = x into Equation 8 produces the following equa-
tion for the policy-maker’s objective function.
V (x) = σ(x,n∗A(x))L+ x (18)
Equation 18 indicates that the policy-maker wishes to choose a level of defensive
expenditure x to minimize the expected loss of a typical target taking into account
the effect that a change in defensive expenditure has on the behaviour of potential
attackers.
Superficially, the policy-maker’s objective in Equation 18 appears to resemble
closely the objective of an individual target in Equation 14. Hence, one might be
led to speculate that any divergence between the policy-maker’s choice, xP, and the
Nash equilibrium value, xE , is not due to a divergence between private and social
incentives as we have asserted in Section 3 but is simply an artifact of the assump-
tion that all players make their choices simultaneously in the Nash equilibrium we
consider. This speculation would not be correct.
To understand the difference between the objective in Equation 18 and the ob-
jective in Equation 14, it is important to note that the function n∗A(x) indicates the
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equilibrium level of attackers per target when the level of defensive expenditure for
each and every target is set equal to x. In other words, the vector of defensive expen-
ditures is the constant vector X = x,x, . . . ,x, for all i = 1, . . . ,NT . In contemplating
a change from the level x to x′, the policy-maker is contemplating a change not in
the level of defensive expenditure for one target but a change in the entire vector of
defensive expenditures from X to X′ = x′,x′, . . . ,x′.
To describe properly a Nash equilibrium where targets move first and, therefore,
take into account the effect of their individual expenditures on the behaviour of at-
tackers, a new function n∗A(xi,Xi) would have to be defined. This function would
indicate how the equilibrium number of attackers changes when the level of defen-
sive expenditure for target i, xi, varies while the levels of defensive expenditure for
all other targets other than i, Xi, are held fixed. Substituting n∗A(xi,Xi) for nAi on the
right-hand side of Equation 14 would produce the objective which is minimized by
a target in a game with sequential moves. This objective is by no means the same
as the objective in Equation 18. Moreover, as demonstrated in Section 3, the ratio-
nale for regulation would not be significantly affected if the unregulated choices of
targets were described by a Nash equilibrium where targets moved first.
There is one special case in which the objectives in Equation 18 and Equation 14
are in fact the same. This is the case where attackers do not respond to the vulnera-
bility of the population of targets so that the number of attackers per target is fixed
exogenously at some level nA. In this case, nAi = nA in Equation 14 and nA(x) = nA
in Equation 18. For this special case, the optimization faced by the policy-maker is
the same as the optimization faced by an individual target. As was also observed in
Section 3, when there are no technological externalities and the number of attackers
is fixed exogenously, the equilibrium levels of defensive expenditure chosen by tar-
gets is the same as those which would be chosen by the policy-maker, and no policy
intervention is required.
In all other cases, the policy-maker must take into account the response of at-
tackers when choosing which level of x to specify for the targets. In particular, the




The dashed and solid curves in Figure 5 show the policy-maker’s loss function,
V (x), with and without the quadratic approximation for σ(x,nA). The square boxes,
where the two curves start, represent the predicted outcomes in the Nash equilib-
rium.
As shown in Figure 5, it turns out that for our example the policy-maker’s loss
function is declining throughout the range of defensive expenditures starting at the
Nash equilibrium levels and ending at a level just below that which deters all at-
tacks. Hence, the optimal choice of defensive expenditure for the policy-maker is
certainly not xE . By increasing the level of defensive expenditure from the Nash
equilibrium level to the highest level in this range, the policy-maker can reduce the
expected loss for each target from a level above 6.5 to a level below 5, a reduction
of approximately 25%.
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Fig. 5 The policy-maker’s loss function, V (x). The curves are truncated below the point where
nA = 1. Since the curves are continuously decreasing for the relevant range of expenditures it is
optimal for the policy-maker to prescribe a value for x corresponding to the lowest point on the
curve. By doing so, the policy-maker reduces the expected loss to each target by approximately
25% compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes which are indicated by the square markers.
In this example, the policy-maker can substantially reduce the average loss suf-
fered by each target by prescribing higher levels of defensive expenditure than those
which would be chosen at the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, for this example, the policy-
maker would find it optimal to choose a mandatory level of defensive expenditure
that would virtually eliminate the threat from attackers.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our paper offers a contribution to the ongoing debate on the appropriate form of
public policy with respect to cyber threats. The paper introduces a model in which
attackers and targets interact strategically. In this model, the levels of defensive ex-
penditure that would be chosen by targets acting independently are not socially op-
timal. This suggests a rationale for regulations that set compulsory minimum levels
of investment in security.
The divergence between private and public incentives that provides the rationale
for regulation occurs because investments in security by one target provide “ex-
ternal” benefits for other targets. Our paper identifies two channels by which such
externalities can occur.
First, there are technological externalities which occur because a vulnerability
in the software or hardware operated by one target may facilitate attacks on other
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targets. In addition, the losses from a successful attack may not be incurred only by
the target that has suffered the attack.
A second type of externality occurs because of the strategic interaction between
targets and attackers. In particular, an investment in security by one target is likely
to make attacks on the entire population of targets less attractive. The worked ex-
ample in Section 4 of the paper focuses on this externality and illustrates with a
plausible set of assumptions that public policy interventions can produce substantial
reductions in the average loss across all targets.
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